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A MIGRANTS’ BILL OF RIGHTS—BETWEEN
RESTATEMENT AND MANIFESTO
GERALD L. NEUMAN*
These comments ﬁrst provide a general perspective on the nature of the
proposed International Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR) and then offer some
speciﬁc observations on the current draft, in particular its provisions on the
subject of equality or nondiscrimination, including but not limited to Article
2.
1.
An international migrants’ bill of rights could be conceived in a number of
ways, each of which would make an important contribution. It could supply a
restatement of existing international law on the rights of migrants, compiling
and collating provisions from different human rights instruments into a
central document. It could ﬂesh out the details of existing instruments by
working out the migrant-speciﬁc consequences of the more generally stated
principles that they contain. Instead, while suppressing detail, it could
articulate an aspirational blueprint for the future negotiation of a migrantspeciﬁc human rights treaty that goes beyond the rights that existing
instruments afford. Or it could amount to a manifesto, a public statement of
the ideals and goals of a political movement.
Each of these models suggests, though it does not require, an appropriate
form. Restatements often list governing rules accompanied by commentary
clarifying some of their ambiguities and documenting the sources of the
rules. An elaboration of migrant-speciﬁc consequences would presumably
identify the generally applicable rules and exhibit the reasoning by which the
more detailed rules particular to migrants were deduced. Aspirational blueprints, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, often set forth
principles at a level of generality to which states can tentatively agree,
postponing the ﬁner-grained questions necessary to give those principles
practical operation for later negotiation and consent. A manifesto addresses
itself to a wider audience and can leap beyond the existing commitments of
states to unaccustomed principles that people should adopt in the future;
manifestos often include polemical reasoning about why those principles
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should be adopted (as opposed to arguments that those principles are already
in force).
Against this background, how should the draft IMBR be understood? It
has elements of all the models just discussed. It currently appears, however,
to be a manifesto in the shape of a restatement.
2.
In evaluating a human rights instrument, it may be important to bear in
mind three possible aspects of a positive human rights norm.1 First, a norm
that acquires positive status through the agreement of states possesses a
consensual aspect resulting from their participation in the adoption of the text
and/or their ratiﬁcation of the instrument as binding upon them. Second, the
norm possesses a suprapositive aspect, to the extent that it gives effect in
positive law, directly or indirectly, to extralegal normative conceptions
regarding the rights of human beings. Third, the norm may possess an
institutional aspect, as a positive legal rule imposing duties on government
actors, possibly subject to review by the courts or other bodies. Enforceable
rules may need to be designed in a manner that facilitates compliance by the
dutyholders and effective oversight. Aspirational instruments that neglect
institutional concerns may need to be supplemented considerably if they are
to be converted into effective legal rules.
We may rightly begin from the deduction that migrants are human beings,
and therefore, they have all the universal rights that attach to the human
person. This deduction is correct as far as it goes, and it states a truth that
non-migrants and states may be prone to ignore or deny. Recalling this truth
and making explicit its consequences would serve an important purpose.
Nonetheless, identifying the universal rights that attach to the human
person is not always an easy task. Human rights instruments may aid in this
inquiry, but several caveats apply. First, human rights instruments do not
always recognize a particular right universally: they often articulate certain
rights as possessed only by a limited category of persons, such as citizens or
residents or persons lawfully within the state’s territory. Second, human
rights instruments often have express or implied limitations as to their overall
scope: they address the rights of persons within the state’s territory, persons
subject to the state’s jurisdiction, or persons connected to the state in some
other way. Everyone has human rights, but at a given moment any particular
person’s rights have practical relevance only with regard to a limited number
of states. Third, some human rights instruments articulate broad principles
rather than enforceable rules, and accordingly have not been drafted precisely enough to identify the limits of those principles. Thus, putting aside the
1. See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866-72 (2003) (discussing these aspects with regard to individual rights
provisions of constitutions and human rights treaties).
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fact that not all states have agreed to the content of all human rights
instruments, compiling a restatement of migrants’ rights that codiﬁes the
positive data supplied by existing human rights instruments would require
conscious attention to the limitations contained in each of them.
A proposed Bill of Rights can go beyond such a positive compilation. It
can call for the abandonment of certain limitations contained in prior
instruments. Different types of reasons could be given for such modiﬁcations. It could be shown that the prior instruments are contradictory and that
provisions they already contain entail a broader set of rights for migrants than
their drafters recognized. Or it could be argued that the current limitations are
normatively unacceptable, so that positive rules should be modiﬁed on
suprapositive grounds. Or states might be persuaded that their own interests,
or the interests of some relevant subset of states, would be better served by
consenting to greater protection for migrants’ rights. Arguments of this kind,
or sufﬁcient arguments of some other kind, would help the proposal to
represent more than the subjective choices of its drafters.
Article 19(2) of the draft IMBR exhorts international bodies to invoke its
provisions in construing the obligations of states under existing human rights
instruments. In doing so, Article 19(2) does not distinguish between the
provisions of the draft IMBR that accurately restate the content of existing
human rights instruments, the provisions that openly innovate, and the
provisions that upon closer examination may be found to innovate without
saying so. Given that the innovations of the draft IMBR do not currently rest
on the consent of states, any use of them would be justiﬁed only by the
inherent persuasive force of the reasoning that supports them. Conclusory
assertions that a particular rule is based on the inherent dignity of migrants do
not contribute very much in the way of persuasive force.

3.
The deﬁnition of migrant in Article 1(1) is “purposefully broad and
inclusive.” It includes everyone except persons who are within a state of
which they are a citizen or national. That apparently includes migrants of all
kinds: legal or illegal, permanent or temporary, private, ofﬁcial or military.
From one perspective this broad deﬁnition is entirely appropriate, because all
of these “migrants” are human beings with human rights, and none of them
should be tortured by any state. But it makes the elaboration of an instrument
that takes into account the differing situations of all the people it purports to
address—including tourists, foreign diplomats, and members of foreign
armed forces—extremely challenging.
The draft IMBR includes rights that, unlike the right not to be tortured,
might not be owed by all states to all persons. Some persons might properly
claim such rights against their own state of nationality, or their state of lawful
residence, rather than against the state in which they are present for the
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moment. Sometimes articles of the draft obscure this problem by declaring a
right and then failing to specify which state owes the migrant the right. Other
articles or paragraphs do specify the state, but may do so in ways that require
additional justiﬁcation.
Compare, for example, Article 16(2) and Article 10(3). The former
provides: “Migrants who have not yet gained citizenship in their host country
shall maintain the citizenship of their country of origin and should as far as
possible enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens of their country of
origin.” This paragraph appears to articulate a right that migrants outside
their country of origin can assert against their country of origin. The content
that it guarantees is ambiguous and not clariﬁed by the Commentary; the
extent to which it guarantees whatever content it covers (“should as far as
possible”) is also ambiguous. Still, it makes clear that migrants should be
able to look to their states of nationality for some of their rights. It may or
may not entail a mandate that states should permit their nationals who reside
overseas to vote in national elections.
Meanwhile, Article 10(3) provides: “States should facilitate migrants’
participation in the civil and political life of their communities and in the
conduct of public affairs.” The Commentary indicates that this paragraph is
intentionally indeterminate as to the modes of participation that it encourages, but the Commentary does not call attention to the ambiguity of the
phrase “their communities.” It seems that the paragraph relates primarily to
alien suffrage and its lesser substitutes, which facilitate the participation of
resident non-nationals in the political life of the state where they reside.
However, it does not say explicitly that it applies only to resident migrants,
and it does not specify whether the right extends to undocumented (i.e.,
unlawfully present) residents or only to lawfully resident migrants.2
4.
The second sentence of Article 2(1) asserts: “Migrants are entitled to the
equal protection of the law on the same basis as nationals of the State in
which they reside.” Is this simply a drafting error, reﬂecting inattention to the
broad deﬁnition of migrant? Or are temporarily present migrants not entitled
to equal protection on the same basis as nationals?3 Article 2 appears to

2. Undocumented residents are permitted to vote in municipal elections in Takoma Park,
Maryland. The draft IMBR and its Commentary do not deﬁne the term “undocumented,” but context
makes clear that it refers to unlawfully present individuals and not individuals who are lawfully
present but have somehow lost or failed to obtain the documents to prove it. Cf. International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
(ICRMW), arts. 43(1)(d), 61(1), 62(1), G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc./A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm, (deﬁning workers who are “nondocumented” or “in an irregular situation”).
3. The language could also be interpreted as saying that nonresident migrants are entitled to equal
protection of the law in a foreign state on the same basis as the nationals of their home state. Although
that set of words is not literally meaningless, it would make no sense as a norm.
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regulate both discrimination between different categories of migrants and
discrimination between migrants and nationals. Article 2(2) goes on to
impose a three-part standard of legitimacy of purpose, objective justiﬁcation,
and reasonable proportionality for separating permissible distinctions from
forbidden discriminations.4 The Commentary gives this standard some
migrant-speciﬁc substance by asserting that the degree of justiﬁcation required by reasonable proportionality should increase “as a migrant’s contact
and connection with the host State increase.”5
Presumably that criterion gives some basis for treating tourists, foreign
diplomats, and visiting members of foreign armed forces less favorably than
lawfully resident migrants. What about undocumented migrants? Are their
contacts and connections to be judged as equivalent to those of otherwise
similarly situated lawfully present migrants? Article 2 and its Commentary
are silent or ambiguous on the question of how unlawful presence affects
evaluations of proportionality. In contrast, some other provisions of the draft
IMBR make explicit their application—or non-application—to undocumented migrants. For example, the Commentary to Article 4 clariﬁes that the
right to due process applies to migrants without lawful status;6 Article 5(3)
explicitly regulates removal procedures for a migrant “whether or not
lawfully within its territory”;7 Article 6(1) applies to detention “irrespective
of the migrant’s legal status”;8 the Commentary to Article 11(2) speaks to the
situation of “[u]ndocumented pregnant women”;9 Article 13(7) makes the
preceding labor rights applicable to migrants “regardless of their legal
status”;10 whereas Article 18(4) addresses derivative family admission rights
only in a country in which a migrant “is lawfully settled.”11 Moreover, the
Commentary to Article 17 distinguishes between primary education and
secondary education, ﬁnding it at least potentially nondiscriminatory for the
state of residence to exclude “children of illegal migrants” from secondary
education on grounds of expense.12 Here, it appears, unlawful status is a
legitimate criterion for allocating government services. This example counteracts the impression that some of the other provisions of the draft IMBR

4. The Commentary expressly recognizes that adoption of the “reasonable proportionality”
requirement amounts to the choice of a more demanding standard employed under some human rights
instruments instead of a lower standard employed under other human rights instruments. It asserts
that the higher standard is “optimal,” but it does not explain why. The mere fact that a standard makes
it harder for states to adopt policies unfavorable to migrants does not make it per se superior to
another standard.
5. IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights: A Commentary, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
411, 425 (2010) [hereinafter Commentary].
6. Id. at 428-33.
7. IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights: Draft in Progress, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
399, 401 (2010) [hereinafter IMBR].
8. Id. at 402.
9. Commentary, supra note 5, at 461.
10. IMBR, supra note 7, at 406.
11. Id. at 407.
12. Commentary, supra note 5, at 485-86.
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may create—that states have only two choices with regard to undocumented
migrants: either remove them or treat them as if their presence was lawful.
On what other occasions, then, would denial of government beneﬁts based on
unlawful status be non-discriminatory?
Meanwhile, “[m]igrants” are guaranteed a set of economic and social
rights by Article 11.13 In particular, Article 11(3) provides that: “Migrants
shall be provided access to medical care, social security, and an adequate
standard of living, including, food, clothing, and housing.”14 The Commentary maintains that these are core economic and social rights not subject to
the tolerant standard of “progressive realization” (para. 2), but also suggests
that what Article 11(3) ensures is merely non-discrimination in access to
those rights (paras. 9, 10).15 Non-discrimination, as in Article 2, requires
reasonable proportionality and permits the state to take into consideration
“among other factors, the degree of a migrant’s connection to the host
State.”16
I am not sure how much difference there is between saying that lawfully
but temporarily present migrants—foreign diplomats, tourists, foreign journalists—have rights against the state in which they are currently present
under Article 11(3) as so deﬁned, and saying that they have no such rights
and should direct their expectations toward their home country. Perhaps
“reasonable proportionality” would permit the state to ignore altogether such
questions as whether reasonably priced hotels are available, even if vacationers have a nominal right to access to housing.17
Article 11(3) is similarly ambiguous about the rights of undocumented
migrants, who may intend a longer presence. The Commentary asserts that
“[t]his paragraph is at the forefront of State practice by guaranteeing a form
of non-discrimination to all migrants.”18 Does that language entail rejection
of the view that states can legitimately use unlawful status as a criterion in
allocating housing? If so, with what justiﬁcation? If not, exactly what
position does the draft IMBR take on this subject?

13. IMBR, supra note 7, at 404.
14. Id.
15. Commentary, supra note 5, at 460-61, 463.
16. Id. at 463.
17. The Migrant Workers Convention recognizes an equal right to access to housing for many
lawfully admitted workers, but expressly excludes “project-tied workers” and “speciﬁed-employment
workers” from a right to participation in social housing schemes. See ICRMW, supra note 2, at arts.
43(1)(d), 61(1), 62(1). “Project-tied workers” are those temporarily admitted to work on a speciﬁc
project; “speciﬁed-employment workers” include a large class of workers temporarily admitted for
purposes of employment. Id. at art. 2(2)(f), 2(2)(g). Ofﬁcials of foreign governments are not covered
by the ICRMW. Id. at art. 3(a). Apparently, however, “project-tied workers” should not exist at all,
because the Commentary to Article 11(6) of the draft IMBR clariﬁes that it seeks to prohibit the
practice of admitting a migrant solely for the purpose of working for a particular employer as per se
abusive.
18. Commentary, supra note 5, at 463.
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5.
Article 2(2) of the draft IMBR expressly provides that distinctions among
migrants in the regulation of admission and exclusion must be justiﬁed under
a standard of “reasonable proportionality.”19 The Commentary rejects the
idea that states are entitled to a margin of appreciation in evaluating their
compliance with this requirement.
The imposition of this standard as a universal requirement for admission
criteria is an innovation of the draft. Initially, it is unclear whether this
provision is undermined by an unintended conﬂict with the deﬁnition of
“migrant,” because would-be migrants who are still within their state of
nationality and applying for visas or attempting to board airplanes are outside
the coverage of the deﬁnition.20 Does the restriction on admission policies
apply only to migrants who have already succeeded in arriving in the
receiving state, or at least have succeeded in leaving their own state by
boarding an aircraft or ship, and if so why should we stop there? A similar
problem arises with regard to Article 5 on removal. Article 5(1) regulates
actions by which a migrant is “removed from the territory of a State, or
refused entry at the borders of a State.” Article 5(3) provides fuller procedures for “seeking to remove a migrant whether or not lawfully within its
territory,” and apparently this means “within its territory, whether or not
lawfully so,” because the Commentary asserts: “Paragraph 3 afﬁrms the
basic procedural limitations on the ability of States to remove migrants
already within their territory. These provisions, unlike paragraph 1, do not
regulate exclusion or other decisions made at the border or outside the
territory of States.”21 Does the latter phrase then mean that Article 5(1) does
apply to admission decisions made prior to arrival at the state’s border,
despite its language, or even despite the deﬁnition of “migrant”? In particular, does Article 5 apply to visa denials and refusals of permission to board
airplanes, as well as refusals at the border?
Next, Article 5(5) provides that migrants shall not be “deported or refused
entry at the border of a State” for engaging in protected activities. The
Commentary describes this rule as “afﬁrm[ing] the speciﬁc content of the
prohibition on nondiscrimination as well as migrants’ civil, political, cultural
and social rights in the context of exclusion and removal,”22 thus apparently
omitting the different context of denial of visas outside the territory of the

19. IMBR, supra note 7, at 400.
20. The Migrant Workers Convention avoids this problem by deﬁning “migrant worker” as
including a person who “is to be engaged” in employment in a foreign state, and by making its
provisions applicable prior to departure from the state of nationality. ICRMW, supra note 2, at arts.
1(2), 2(1). It does not, however, recognize the broad right of equality proposed in the draft IMBR.
21. Commentary, supra note 5, at 435.
22. Id. at 436 (emphasis added). Tangentially, were economic rights omitted from this list by
inadvertence? Or for some normative reason? Or as a recognition, rare in the draft IMBR, that Article
2(3) of the ICESCR permits developing states to limit the economic rights of non-nationals?
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state. Thus, Article 5 also raises the question of whether the draft IMBR’s
nondiscrimination principle reaches would-be migrants or only those who
have already migrated. Perhaps, however, all these conﬂicts are unintentional, and the proposal to subject admission policies to a proportionality test
does not depend on the fortuity of whether the would-be migrants have left
their home country.
Even if Article 2(2) does make this fortuity determinative as a matter of
deﬁnition, the question would remain how it applies to migrants who present
themselves at the border of states without a necessary visa because they
applied for one and were denied. Can they be refused ipso facto for lack of a
visa, because that procedural requirement satisﬁes Article 2(2), or should we
look behind the lack of visa to the reasons why the visa was denied? In the
latter case, those earlier reasons are the basis on which the migrants, who are
now rights-holders under Article 2(2), have been refused entry, and those
reasons must be nondiscriminatory.
What justiﬁes the proposal in Article 2(2)? The Commentary asserts that
its test “represents the optimal compromise between protecting sovereign
functions that predate the development of international human rights law and
safeguarding the welfare of migrants.” One might ask why the goal of
“safeguarding the welfare of migrants” was universally implicated by admissions policies. Is the assumption that “fundamental human dignity” entails
that everyone on earth has a prima facie liberty of entry to every country,
absent sufﬁcient countervailing interests? (The claim that individuals should
not be denied entry for degrading reasons such as racial discrimination might
justify some equality-based limits on admission policies, but would not go
nearly so far as draft Article 2(2) does.) The vision of universal freedom of
travel has some attraction in a globalizing world,23 but states have been
consistently reluctant to endorse the concept of a general right of entry.
Taking Article 2(2) together with Article 11(1), it appears that all would-be
labor migrants have a prima facie liberty of access to the labor market of any
state.
Nervous as states may be about applying equality to rights of entry in
principle, they would be especially concerned about submitting such a right
to third-party adjudication. As previously mentioned, Article 19(2) of the
draft IMBR exhorts international bodies to invoke its provisions in construing the obligations of states under existing human rights instruments. The
result would be that not only measures affecting refugees and family
members of existing state residents, but all measures limiting access to the
state’s territory, on grounds such as public health, economic policy, congestion, or ﬁscal capacity, would be subject to independent review, with no
margin of appreciation, by an external body. It may require additional

23. Cf. GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 125-28 (1996) (considering the
possibility of a prima facie constitutional liberty to enter the United States).
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argument to demonstrate why such a regime would strike an appropriate
balance between the rights and welfare of migrants and the rights and welfare
of non-migrants.
In closing, I congratulate the authors on the progress that they have made
in this valuable project. I would also emphasize that some of my comments
prompted by the draft may lose their pertinence as that project develops
further.

